Revenge for the Condemned by Beale, Sara Sun & Haagen, Paul H.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 94 Issue 6 
1996 
Revenge for the Condemned 
Sara Sun Beale 
Duke University 
Paul H. Haagen 
Duke University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Legal History 
Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sara S. Beale & Paul H. Haagen, Revenge for the Condemned, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1622 (1996). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol94/iss6/13 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
REVENGE FOR THE CONDEMNED 
Sara Sun Beale* 
and Paul H. Haagen** 
THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 
1770-1868. By V.A.C. Gatrell New York: Oxford University 
Press. 1994. Pp. xix, 634. $35. 
INTRODUCTION 
David Donald begins his Pulitzer Prize-winning biography of 
Abraham Lincoln by recounting the story of President John F. 
Kennedy's annoyance with a group of scholars who had hoped to 
enlist him in a poll that ranked American presidents. No one who 
had not sat in the Oval Office, and who did not experience the pres-
sures of the presidency, Kennedy bristled, could judge any of them 
failures. Taking Kennedy's observation to heart, Donald informs 
his readers that he had set himself the task of explaining, not judg-
ing, Lincoln.1 
Victor Gatrell2 takes the opposite tack. As he notes in the pref-
ace, The Hanging Tree does not aim at objectivity (pp. ix-x). It 
claims to be "an emotional book" (p. ix), and it is certainly a judg-
mental one. Gatrell is appalled by the "furred homicides and sable 
bigots" who administered the English criminal law of the early 
nineteenth century and defended its reliance on capital punishment 
(pp. 497-514). He wants his readers to be appalled as well. He dis-
misses the leading common law judges of the period as bad-
tempered mediocrities (pp. 502-14). King George IV, who began 
his reign determined not to execute anyone, emerges as "less a hu-
mane man than a sentimental or squeamish one," and one who was 
weak and ineffective to boot (p. 551). Gatrell denies Robert Peel 
the role of legal reformer and characterizes him as "the great hang-
man," a seriously flawed human being, only partially redeemed by 
the candor with which he revealed his questionable motives 
(p. 568). Gatrell judges all of them failures. Even the saintly 
Elizabeth Fry is portrayed as a person who was "prejudicially selec-
* Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, University of Michigan. -
Ed. The author would like to thank Robert Mosteller and Duncan Beale for their thoughtful 
comments on a draft of this review. 
** Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1972, Haverford; B.A. 1974, Oxford; M.A. 
1976, Princeton; J.D. 1982, Yale; Ph.D. 1986, Princeton. - Ed. 
1. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 13 (1995). 
2. History Fellow of Gonville and Cauis College, Cambridge University. 
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tive" in her campaigns on behalf of prisoners (pp. 404-05). Nor 
does Gatrell reserve his invective for those who are long and safely 
dead. He rejects the analyses of modem historians from Cynthia 
Herrup to E.P. Thompson as inadequate, and characterizes the ap-
proach taken by Tom Laqueur in interpreting the behavior of the 
scaffold crowd as "absurd" (pp. 29, 220). 
As Gatrell explains, the scale of the phenomenon of hanging in 
England and Wales fueled his anger. Gatrell estimates that 35,000 
men, women, and children were condemned to death in England 
and Wales between 1770 and 1830 (p. 7). Though most were re-
prieved to the hulks or transported to Australia, approximately 
7,000 were executed (p. 7). After a sharp decline in the number of 
hangings in the early years of the nineteenth century, executions 
significantly increased with the end of the Napoleonic Wars. In 
London alone, sixty-five people were hanged between 1816 and 
1830, compared with only seventy-nine during the eighty years from 
1701 to 1780.3 In London, the authorities hanged an average of 
twenty-three persons per year throughout the 1820s (p. 9). Then, 
suddenly, the system ground to a virtual halt. After the Whigs 
came to power there were reforms in both law and practice, and 
death sentences dropped from well over four hundred in 1837 to 
fifty-six in 1839 (p. 9). Gatrell calls the "retreat from hanging" in 
the 1830s the most sudden and important "revolution in English 
penal history" (p. 10). 
Gatrell explores how various segments of society in England felt 
as the number of executions increased dramatically during "the 
bloody code's fullest flowering" (p. ix) and then, quite suddenly, fell 
to a trickle in the late 1830s. The Hanging Tree ends in 1868, when 
Parliament abolished public executions. The book is divided into 
six main parts, plus an epilogue. The first three parts explore the 
reactions of the plebeian and polite classes of English society. The 
fourth and sixth parts consider the development and manipulation 
of public opinion and the official response to individual mercy peti-
tions and to penal reform efforts, focusing on judges, the King-in-
Council, and Home Secretary Robert Peel. The fifth part is a 
microhistory, developed from one of the most extensive mercy ap-
peal files in the Home Office archives. The epilogue explores the 
events leading up to the legislation that abolished public executions 
in 1868. 
The Hanging Tree is an extremely dense 611 pages. It includes 
enough material to make up several books, including a microhistory 
about a rape trial and its aftermath; a book about the flash ballads, 
3. See p. 497. Gatrell's numbers appear to be for the City of London, although it is not 
possible to tell from the text. His footnote refers readers to the appendix, which shows statis-
tics for London and Middlesex (325 executed between 1816 and 1830). See p. 616. 
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broadsides, and other evidence of plebeian attitudes toward public 
hangings; a book about the attitudes of the polite classes toward 
hangings; and a book about the appeals process, the individual peti-
tions, and the official responses to them. The successful combina-
tion of all of these elements in a single book would have required 
unusually effective editing, which Gatrell did not provide. The re-
sult is a book only marginally better than the sum of its parts. 
Part I of this review provides some background on the period in 
question, discusses the organization and themes of The Hanging 
Tree, and examines the evidence from the flash ballads, broadsides, 
and mercy petitions. Part II evaluates The Hanging Tree as a work 
of legal history, and Part III evaluates it as a commentary on some 
of the law reform issues of our own time. 
I. BACKGROUND 
By the end of the eighteenth century there were over 200 capital 
crimes in England's criminal code - the so-called bloody code -
and two-thirds of the executions during the period before the re-
forms of the 1830s were for property crimes, including burglary, 
housebreaking, robbery, forgery, and theft of horses, sheep, or cat-
tle (p. 7). Although wealthy murderers and forgers were hanged 
occasionally, most of those hanged were the "poor and marginal-
ized" (p. 8). Public hangings constituted a significant and frequent 
ritual in metropolitan and urban provincial life and were embedded 
deeply in the collective imagination.4 Crowds of 30,000 to 40,000 
commonly attended executions, and reports place crowds of 100,000 
at London's most highly publicized executions.5 
Gatrell forces the reader beyond the euphemisms that typically 
enshroud discussions of the spectacle that those crowds witnessed. 
Arguing that other historians have sanitized the process (p. 29), he 
insists that the reader confront "the bleaker truth which social 
memory has censored - that most felons went to their deaths in 
quaking terror" (p. 37). He details the agony of death on the gal-
lows, where suffocation took five, ten, or even fifteen minutes, and 
4. Seep. 30. Gatrell calculates that a Londoner growing up in the 1780s could have at-
tended 400 execution days outside Newgate, and, if diligent, could have witnessed 1200 peo-
ple hang. See p. 32. 
5. See p. 7. Why did huge crowds assemble for executions, and travel long distances to 
attend provincial executions? Gatrell's explanation reveals the Freudian underpinnings of 
his view of human behavior and The Hanging Tree's highly personal style. He observes that 
executions provided welcome excitement in the drab lives of the lower classes, as well as 
other gratifications, including the encounter with repressed wishes that the criminals vicari-
ously enacted, the engagement in quasi-erotic fantasies about the prisoner, and the exorcism 
of personal guilt projected onto the prisoner. See pp. 73-74. Recognizing these multiple 
possibilities, Gatrell concludes that "the one of greatest interest to us henceforth relates to 
the ways in which witnesses evaded the pain threatened in an identification with the victim." 
P. 74. 
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sometimes came only when the hangman pulled on the condemned 
prisoner's legs to put him out of his agony (pp. 45-50). Execution-
ers bungled some hangings so badly that the prisoner had to be 
hanged again (p. 50). Despite technological advances in other 
fields, executions remained primitive and painful under "a policy of 
deliberate neglect: hanging was never meant to be a dignified or 
peaceful quietus" (p. 51). 
A. Plebeian Attitudes 
How did plebeians behave at executions, and what did they re-
ally think of them, and of the law? Gatrell argues that plebeian 
views of the hanging laws were far more complex than previously 
understood, either by historians or by the polite society that ab-
horred the crowd's behavior at executions. Gatrell challenges the 
view that the crowd celebrated executions in a drunken camival-
like atmosphere. He does not deny the fact of the outward behav-
iors but interprets them as strategies of psychological defense: 
"[T]he crowd's passion was not always or chiefly celebratory or 
ghoulish. On the contrary, its passion helped to cancel out terror 
while camouflaging its submission to the authority that did these 
things" (p. 76). 
Gatrell employs two contemporary accounts of the same execu-
tion to illustrate the gap between the real feelings of the crowd and 
the interpretation of polite observers, and to demonstrate one of 
the major forms of plebeian response to the hanging laws. In 1848 a 
barrister wrote disapprovingly about the insolent bearing of a pris-
oner who " 'died with the apparent insensibility of a dog,' " and 
about the prisoner's mother, who cried "Bravo" when her son 
dropped, expressed pleasure that he "died game," and left the exe-
cution with others to 'go drinking in a public house.6 Other ac-
counts reveal, however, that the prisoner in question was far from 
indifferent to his fate. The Times reported that the prisoner pro-
tested his innocence until the eve of his execution and then wept 
while writing farewell letters to his family and sending them locks 
of his hair so that something of himself might survive (p. 109). Tak-
ing comfort in the sheriff's promise to send his family home to 
Yorkshire, the prisoner bowed to the crowd at the scaffold and then 
" 'suffered severely' " when he dropped.7 As for the prisoner's sup-
porters in the crowd, Gatrell argues that they hid their true feelings 
and refused to play along with the state's ritual. The way to cope 
with the pain and shame of the gallows was "to display your con-
tempt for it, to applaud the victim's courage, to parade your own 
6. P. 109 (quoting w. HEPWORTH DIXON, JOHN HOWARD, AND THE PRISON WORLD OF 
EUROPE 275-76 {1849)). 
7. See pp. 109-10 (quoting THE TIMES (London) Jan. 11, 1848). 
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courage in fellowship, and to lead life onwards" (p. 111). "[D]on't 
let the bastards grind you down."s 
Gatrell finds the same spirit in the flash ballads. Flash ballads 
celebrated "drink, devil-may-care heroism, and bleak endings at 'fy-
burn," and provide, Gatrell argues, the best evidence of the real 
attitudes of the common people toward executions.9 The flash bal-
lads "confronted life's horrors without moralizing and sentimental-
ity, and then refused to take them seriously" (p. 123). The energy 
of the songs was not for protest, but a celebration of triumph over 
adversity or getting something for nothing (p. 133). 
Although some of the ballads are filled so with cant terms that 
they are difficult to follow even with the explanatory footnotes, the 
ballad of Jack (later Sam) Hall strongly supports Gatrell's point. 
The earliest known version concludes: 
I sail'd up Holborn Hill in a cart, in a cart, 
I sail'd up Holborn Hill in a cart. 
I sail'd up Holborn Hill, at St. Giles's drunk my fill, 
And at Tyburn made my will in a cart, in a cart. [p. 141] 
The last three stanzas of a popular later version express piety and 
contempt for authority even more clearly: 
Then the sheriff he will come, 
He will come, 
Then the sheriff he will come, 
And he'll look so gallows glum, 
And he'll talk of kingdom come, 
Blast his eyes. 
Then the hangman will come too, 
Will come too, 
Then the hangman will come too, 
With all his bloody crew, 
And he'll tell me what to do, 
Blast his eyes. 
And now I goes up stairs 
Goes up stairs, 
And now I goes up stairs, 
Here's an end to all my cares, 
So tip up at your prayers, 
Blast your eyes. [(pp. 142-43] 
Gatrell identifies the subversive attitudes of this ballad - the re-
fusal to be defeated, the cockiness, the celebration of cleverness, 
8. P. 111. Gatrell also explores the question of whether the crowd's attendance at the 
executions shows its approval of the Jaw and the executions. See pp. 99-105. 
9. P. 123. Gatrell also provides a short appendix giving the text of several flash songs 
recorded from memory by Francis Place, including translations of cant terms. See pp. 149-55. 
May 1996] The Hanging Tree 1627 
the facing of execution without :flinching - as key components of 
crowd behavior until the end of public executions (p. 144). 
The flash songs, however, did not sum up all of the attitudes that 
the plebeian crowd displayed at the gallows. Gatrell concedes that 
some members of the crowd exhibited other attitudes, such as "ac-
quiescence, approval, identification with the law" (p. 156), and that 
these attitudes were shown in the popular printed broadside ac-
counts of the executions. Unlike the fl.ash songs, the broadsides 
were not subversive. Repetitive and formulaic, they sounded the 
themes of repentance and retribution. Instead of giving sensational 
details from each case, broadsides employed vague euphemisms, 
such as the saying that the prisoner "launched into eternity" 
(p. 175). The most noticeable feature of the broadsides was their 
simple woodcut illustrations; printers made little or no effort to re-
flect the particulars of the execution in question, and the same illus-
trations "did service for generations" (pp. 175-76). 
Gatrell theorizes that the commercial success of the broad-
sides10 reflects the fact that the broadsides were "totemic artifacts" 
that served as "symbolic substitutes for the experiences," me-
mentoes of events worth "reifying" (p. 175). People bought the ex-
ecution sheets not to learn the details of a particular execution, but 
because the ritually inflicted deaths had to be "tamed and pos-
sessed" (p. 175). The illustrations were ideograms, not clumsy 
representations.11 
B. Attitudes Among the Polite Classes 
What about the feelings of the middle class, the literary, profes-
sional, and commercial people? Gatrell disagrees with the tradi-
tional view that the improved morals and increased humanity 
brought about the reform of the English penal laws (pp. 11, 325). 
Instead, he makes a three-part psychoanalytic argument: 
(1) People had (and have) an "elemental excitement [and curi-
osity] about what happened on scaffolds" (pp. 238-39). "The Scaf-
fold tap[ s] into primal excitement and curiosity about death, 
aggression, and destructiveness, while in the crowd's enjoyment of 
its own unanimity and in its support for the condemned, it might 
10. Despite the repetitive quality of both the text and the illustrations, the broadsides 
were extremely popular, selling as many as 2.5 million copies after some executions in the 
mid-nineteenth century. See pp. 158-59. Execution sheets sold in even the poor and remote 
areas; two poor families in one village pooled their money to purchase a sheet, and 11 people 
listened as an old man read it to them by firelight. Seep. 173. 
11. What then of the deferential and even self-abasing language of the mercy appeals? 
Gatrell asserts that the flash ballads and the broadsides provide a more reliable gauge of the 
feelings of plebeian England than the mercy petitions filed by them and on their behalf. The 
petitions were often calculated and instrumental, their deference merely postured. See p. 
218. 
1628 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1622 
also bizarrely have been an arena of love" (p. 239). Initially, this 
was the attitude of the polite classes, including Samuel Pepys 
(p. 244), John Evelyn (p. 245), Henry Angelo, Walpole, Henry Mat-
thews, and James Curtis (p. 253). 
(2) The attitude of the polite classes shifted significantly at the 
end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and taboos 
began to develop about executions. The old curiosity was no longer 
acceptable,12 and the crowd - rather than the execution - be-
came the scapegoat and the target of contempt. Newspapers criti-
cized members of the polite classes who attended (p. 261). 
(3) Despite the social sanctions, many people could not suppress 
their curiosity about the scaffold, so unconscious defenses became 
necessary to tame these drives.13 The defenses became "the social-
ized, conscious, and judgemental self" (p. 240). But the defenses 
did not work perfectly. Repressed curiosity caused conflicts and 
anxieties, as well as fantasies and regressions overlaid with shame 
and guilt. 
Gatrell argues that concepts such as justice, fairness, and hu-
manity were important elements in the reasoned attack on the 
ancien regime but insists that "it was through the emotional 
resonances associated with these images that opinion would be 
chiefly touched. "14 He employs two examples to demonstrate how 
a fusion of rational argument and emotional appeal could shift un-
derstanding of the capital-punishment laws and permit the proper-
tied classes to identify with the plight of those sentenced to be 
hanged .. He characterizes each as involving a female prisoner who 
was "young, pretty, wrongly judged, and wrongly hanged" (p. 340). 
The first story is largely about the personal emotional journey of 
one country gentleman, Capel Lofft. Lofft was an eccentric barris-
ter, justice of the peace, and sometime radical. He had for years 
opposed the "vindictive jealousy" (p. 343) of the criminal law. In 
12. Gatrell gives several examples of this new uneasiness. For example, by 1779 Boswell 
began to fear that others would think his fascination unhealthy, and George Selwyn, who had 
well·known necrophilic tastes, was said to have disguised himself in women's clothing to at-
tend executions. See p. 262. 
13. For a brief Freudian explanation of unconscious mechanisms of defense, and of vari· 
ous defenses, see pp. 266-67 & n.19. 
14. P. 326. Gatrell identifies a relatively small group of committed reformers - far 
smaller than the group that opposed slavery, for example - and suggests that they appealed 
to a public opinion that to a significant degree, they, themselves, had created. He suggests 
that, among the reformers, lawyers played a more influential role than commonly under-
stood, while Quakers were latecomers whose influence has been overestimated. Among the 
relatively small group of Quakers (no more than 20,000 during the period in question), most 
were not active on the issue of capital punishment, and Gatrell demonstrates that those who 
were active confined themselves principally to opposing the death sentences of wealthy 
Quakers. See pp. 403-13. For example, they mounted campaigns against hanging for forgery, 
but not for the offenses committed by a large number of poor pe_ople, such as shoplifting, 
burglary, or horse stealing. See pp. 408-16. 
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the spring of 1800, Rev. Hay Drummond sought Lofft's assistance 
in petitioning the Home Secretary to commute the death sentence 
of a young servant girl named Sarah Lloyd. There was no doubt 
that Lloyd had committed the crime of which she had been con-
victed, stealing her mistress's property, but Drummond believed 
that she did not deserve to die for the crime. After meeting her, 
Lofft agreed. He threw himself wholeheartedly into the effort to 
save her life. He became convinced that she was a victim, and that 
her lover, Joseph Clarke, was the real villain. Lofft believed that 
Clarke had seduced her, brought her under his power, and induced 
her to commit the crime. When Lofft failed to interest the Home 
Secretary in the plight of this young woman, he became agitated, 
"suicidally so" (p. 347). "Identifying body and soul with the victim-
woman in Sarah Lloyd upon whom he projected his long frustra-
tions, and then in love with the creature he made of her" (p. 353), 
Lofft rode with Lloyd in the cart on the way to her execution 
(p. 348). This justice of the peace then mounted the scaffold with 
the condemned servant girl, and harangued the crowd for fifteen 
minutes eulogizing her and denouncing the Home Secretary. He 
later addressed a crowd of one thousand at her funeral (p. 349). 
These actions cost Lofft - whose behavior had been erratic for 
some time before his encounter with Sarah Lloyd (p. 345) - his 
position as a magistrate. He became increasingly eccentric and out 
of touch in the ensuing years (pp. 352-53). For Gatrell, the ability 
of this one justice of the peace to identify with a victim of the capi-
tal code was, nonetheless, "magnificen[t]" (p. 353). 
The second and far more influential case was that of Eliza 
Penning, a twenty-two-year-old cook, convicted of poisoning sev-
eral members of the household in which she worked. Public inter-
est and indignation over her case produced, not the personal 
transformation of one country gentleman, but rather a broader soci-
etal response reflected in an unusual outpouring of newspaper arti-
cles, ballads, pamphlets, and engravings. After she was hanged in 
1815, John Watkins and William Hone published a book of unprec-
edented length for such works, 194 pages with a forty-six page ap-
pendix, detailing the mishandling of the case and "warning people 
'to put little confidence in the reasonings of fallible magistrates, 
who have grown old in the ministration of death' " (p. 366). Her 
supporters put her body on public display "and for four days people 
queued to see it" (p. 356), marveling that her body did not change 
color for three days (p. 366). Ten thousand Londoners attended her 
funeral. She became a martyr, "as close to beatification as 
Londoners would ever bring a wronged maiden," and a symbol of 
incompetence and corruption in the administration of criminal jus-
tice. Witnesses referred to her case in testimony before the Lords' 
committee on capital punishment in 1856 (p. 368), and Charles 
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Dickens recalled it indignantly eleven years after that (p. 368). 
Fifty-six years after the event, Charles Hindley remembered 
Penning as " 'a beauteous innocent creature', her gallows dress 'as 
spotless as her own purity' " (p. 368). 
What made Fenning's case so compelling, according to Gatrell, 
was that she was pretty, young, female, and pious-sounding (p. 361), 
the case against her was weak, the court's handling of it was appal-
ling, and the press was interested (pp. 359-61). The combination, 
Gatrell insists, mobilized a critique of the law through ''identifica-
tion with the plight[] of [a woman] wrongly condemned" (p. 370). 
Through "luxuriant sentiment and sentimentality," it permitted, he 
contends, a projection that sustained a radical attack on the crimi-
nal law (p. 370). 
Upon closer examination, however, the fact that this case cre-
ated so much public excitement is even more interesting than 
Gatrell suggests, because the record in the case was much less 
straight-forward than he portrays it. One or more contemporary 
witnesses contradicted every part of his characterization of the case. 
Penning may have sounded pious, but, her employers insisted, she 
was not. The case against her, based on the testimony of her em-
ployers and a fellow servant, was that she had opportunity and mo-
tive. They testified that she was the only person with access to both 
the poison and the food, that she had a grudge against the family, 
and that she had warned another servant not to eat the poisoned 
food., The judge who handled the case apparently did have a bad 
reputation, but the bad reputation had been there for some time, 
and reactions to the trial did not force him from the bench. After 
her conviction, a local chemist came forward to claim that a mem-
ber of the family for whom Penning worked had "threatened 
poisoning" and acted " 'wild and deranged' " (p. 360), but the King-
in-Council apparently heard this evidence and was not impressed 
with its credibility or relevance (p. 360). After the trial, reports sur-
faced that Penning had a disreputable character and had threatened 
the prosecutor in her case. None of this apparently mattered either 
to Hone, Watkins, or the others who took up her case, nor to those 
who accepted Hone and Watkins's characterization of it. The story 
that they told about Eliza Penning must have tapped into anxieties 
about criminal law, and significant segments of the public were pre-
pared to believe it. 
C. Mercy Petitions and the Response of the Polite Classes 
to Law Reform 
Part IV of The Hanging Tree describes the old order's view of 
the function of the criminal law and its response to mercy petitions. 
Gatrell argues that Tories thought that only terror would protect 
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the public interest (pp. 518-19). The function of the criminal justice 
system was not to determine individual guilt or innocence, nor to 
determine the appropriate punishment for individual defendants, 
but rather to inspire the terror necessary to uphold the social order. 
This view was stated clearly by Archdeacon William Paley: 
It was 'necessary to the good order of society, and to the reputation 
and authority of government' that people believe that convictions de-
pended upon the proof of guilty and that sentences were appropriate 
to the crimes. But should. mistakes happen and innocent sometimes 
hang, 'he who falls by a mistaken sentence, may be considered as fall-
ing for his country'. The chief end of the criminal law was not justice 
but 'the welfare of the community'. [(pp. 517-18] 
In Gatrell's account, all of the major actors in the criminal justice 
system - the judges, the King-in-Council, and the Home Secretary 
- shared this view of the function of the criminal law. 
Gatrell derisively calls the criminal court judges "furred homi-
cides" and "sable bigots" (p. 497). The criminal courts were at the 
bottom of the judicial hierarchy (pp. 502-05), and Gatrell concludes 
that the mediocre judges who served there had no sympathy with or 
interest in the lower classes and easily rationalized the harsh judi-
cial system that helped preserve their "[e]conomic and status self-
interest" (p. 498). The criminal court judges "worked within a crim-
inal justice system which quite purposefully upheld propertied hier-
archy first and delivered justice second, in which respectable 
patronage, perceived character, and local tensions were meant to 
affect sentences and appeals . . . in which juries were often timid, 
mercy grudging, [and] pardons rare" (p. 515). 
The review of mercy petitions showed a similar disregard for 
justice in individual cases. Gatrell argues that George IV and his 
Cabinet Council wielded the power of life and death with "remote 
and capricious disdain" (p. 543). The Cabinet members were 
"aloof, arrogant, and merciless beings" who were "insulated from 
the cramped worlds of those whom they decided to kill, [and] half-
attentive to the death-dealing business at hand" (p. 543). Though 
the King began his reign saying that he wished to have no more 
executions (p. 553), and he favored respiting nearly every death 
sentence that he considered, Gatrell faults him for having "little 
strength or determination in his gestures on behalf of the con-
demned" and generally capitulating to stronger voices, especially 
the voice of Robert Peel (p. 551 ). 
As Home Secretary, Peel established his dominance over the 
Council and the King in determining the fate of those sentenced to 
death in the Old Bailey, and he dominated the provincial petitions 
as well. Although Peel recognized the need to respond to "the glar-
ing anomaly of sentencing people to death when it was public 
knowledge that they would not be hanged" (p. 569) and supported 
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the repeal of many of the capital punishment statutes, he nonethe-
less bullied the King into approving the execution of many the King 
sought to save. Gatrell concludes that Peel never wavered in his 
support for the central tenets of the old regime - "the royal pre-
rogative of mercy and the discretionary element in judicial and ex-
ecutive power" (p. 583). 
Gatrell identifies among the mercy petitions he reviewed many 
defendants whose convictions were upheld (though the sentences 
often were respited to transportation or imprisonment on the 
hulks) despite the fact that they were innocent or their guilt was 
highly questionable. One example will give the flavor of the cases 
Gatrell discusses. Benjamin Ellis was sentenced to death for high-
way robbery despite his claim, corroborated by the testimony of his 
three brothers, that he was home asleep at the time of the offense 
(pp. 423-27). An independent investigation by a wealthy and disin-
terested gentleman produced confessions by two others and corrob-
orated these confessions by the recovery of the gun Ellis had been 
convicted of stealing. The appeal revealed that there had been no 
highway robbery, as the gun had been left at the scene of the crime, 
and in any event the men who confessed were the perpetrators of 
any offense that did occur. The investigation also uncovered a let-
ter that established that a man against whom Ellis had a legal action 
pending had prejudiced the magistrate. Peel nonetheless allowed 
Ellis's conviction and sentence to stand, and he was sent to the 
Hulks and eventually to Australia. 
Gatrell's bleak conclusion is that most petitioners, like Ellis, 
were denied relief in an appeal process structured to uphold and 
reinforce the social order by terror, when doing justice in individual 
cases was at best a secondary consideration: 
Even when convictions were obviously dubious or sentences exces-
sive, the luckiest petitioners could hope only for "conditional" par-
dons. This meant that they were left off hanging on condition of 
confinement to the penal hulks or transportation for life, or left off 
transportation on condition of imprisonment at home. E".en those 
whose innocence was tacitly admitted were kept on the hulks for an 
exemplary period of half their sentence or so and then pardoned, as if 
the law's dignity must be sustained, its errors never openly admitted. 
[p. 207; footnotes omitted] 
D. Why Did the Law Change? How Important Was the 
Culture of Sensibility? 
Why did the law change? Gatrell rejects the usual account of 
the reform of the English penal laws, which ties it to "the improve-
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ment of morals and manners [and] the growth of humanity."15 As-
sociating himself with Foucault16 and Elias,11 Gatrell suggests that 
"shifts in sensibility of this order usually ensue from rather than 
induce redeployments of power, so it is to two other causes that we 
should give priority" (p. 610). Early in the book, Gatrell states: 
[H]umane feelings prevail when their costs in terms of security or 
comfort are bearable; when they can be productively acted upon; and 
when they bring emotional and status returns to the 'humane' .... 
Culturally dominant groups most deplore brutality when the state's 
authority or their own is strong enough to obviate the need for its 
outward display. In these conditions the humane people are usually 
those who eat, prosper, and are safe. [p. 12] 
In other words, the development of the modem state, which obvi-
ated the need for the outward display of the gallows, was a neces-
sary precondition for expression of more humane feelings in law. 
By the 1830s and 1840s a new form of disciplinary state was devel-
oping (pp. 296-97). There were professional police forces, better 
incentives that encouraged more prosecutions, and new penitentia-
ries. Magistrates' courts were operating more efficiently and "disci-
plining more people more speedily, cheaply, and lightly than 
before. Hangings began to look unmodem, and disgust at them ap-
propriate" (p. 297). 
Once this precondition was met, Gatrell argues, law reform took 
place because of "a structural problem within the criminal law itself 
- in an overloading of the capital code which ensured that its repu-
diation had to come about sooner or later" (p. 19). The large in-
crease in prosecutions and in capital sentences led to an even 
greater increase in the percentage of death sentences respited be-
cause "there was a threshold beyond which the number of execu-
tions could not safely pass" (p. 20). But, once ninety-five percent of 
those sentenced to death in London - and over ninety percent 
elsewhere - were reprieved, the capital code came to look "ran-
domly cruel and terminally silly" (p. 21). In other words, "[t]he 
bloody code might fairly be said to have collapsed under pressure 
of the criminal law's mounting prosecutory effectiveness" (p. 21). 
Gatrell argues that these factors were sufficient to explain the re-
15. P. 11 (quoting 4 LEON RADZINOWICZ, HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAw AND hs 
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 352-53 (1968)). 
16. Foucault theorized that public executions were integral to the symbolic display of 
sovereign might. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON 32-69 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (1975). Gatrell notes that the collapse of English 
execution rates in the 1830s and the abolition of public executions in 1868 paralleled "the 
state's consolidation and bureaucratic competence," making symbolic displays of state power 
Jess necessary. P. 16. 
17. Elias fused Freudian psychoanalytical theory and the history of political processes, 
claiming that the expanding State imposed emotional restraints on subjects. With economic 
diversification and bureaucratization, "self-control became both a mark of status and a condi-
tion of efficiency." P. 17 (citing NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS (1939)). 
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duction in the number of capital crimes and capital prosecutions, 
but he sees other factors at work in the abolition of public execu-
tions in 1868. He disagrees with the general assumption that mov-
ing the executions inside the prisons was humane (p. 590). In 
Gatrell's view, it advanced urban decorum and civility by merely 
hushing up - but not ending - the horror of executions (p. 590). 
Gatrell believes that a consensus developed that hangings should 
continue for some crimes, despite the anxiety, shame, and squea-
mishness that they provoked among elites. The polite classes' dis-
like of the scaffold crowd increased because the crowd mirrored the 
state's violence too candidly. The crowd came to seem "a repudi-
ated alter ego or shadow-self which spoke too truthfully for a pro-
gressive nation to tolerate" (p. 24). Private executions appeased 
the squeamish culture and eliminated the plebeian execution 
crowd's mockery of polite Victorians' pretensions to civility. In 
fact, the private executions were more cruel, because they removed 
the crowd that had supported the prisoners. 
Gatrell concludes "that Victorians' civility only veneered the 
state's violence over; that in hiding penal violence they consulted 
their own feelings and not those of the punished; and that within 
the secret prison power was to be - and is - wielded more effi-
ciently than ever it had ever been at Tybum" (pp. 610-11). 
II. THE HANGING TREE AS HISTORY 
The tendentiousness that characterizes most of the judgments 
made in this book leads to the assumption that the arguments being 
made are deeper and more radical than they in fact are. But for 
such an emotional book, its major conclusions, with the exception 
of those relating to judgments about the motivation or character of 
individuals, are cautious and inconclusive. Anxieties about harsh 
law in the 1820s, he concludes, worked on many levels. Queasiness, 
piety, and Quaker hectoring all played their part on "many psychic 
and social levels" (p. 416), but Gatrell fails to give any pride of 
place. The Introduction suggests doubt about the importance of the 
1867 Reform Act in the decision to abolish public hanging, only to 
have the Epilogue suggest otherwise, albeit in similarly cautious 
terms.18 Surprisingly, given the tone of the book, its contributions 
to historical debate about criminal law, law reform, crowds, punish-
ment, and popular understanding of law are ones of shading, nu-
ance, and labeling. Having first mocked a "body of social 
historians" for their inadequate treatment of the question of the 
relationship between mercy and deference (p. 213), Gatrell con-
18. Compare p. 23 (Introduction) with p. 609 (Epilogue). 
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eludes that the differences between him and them are merely ones 
of emphasis. 
As Gatrell himself recognizes, The Hanging Tree does not 
change our understanding of the chronology of legal change (p. vii). 
Although he states that "we owe it to the subject (and to specialists) 
... to count and compare the numbers condemned and hanged in 
this period" (p. 6), the counting and comparing are done more for 
rhetorical effect than for analytical purposes.19 The Hanging Tree 
makes no attempt at a serious contribution to the history of legal 
doctrine or penal theory. While it does persuasively add its voice to 
those that have depicted nineteenth century legal reform as more 
ambiguous than previously had been thought, its conclusions com-
port with recent revisionist history.20 What the book does is pres-
ent a very rich account of the complex and conflicted responses to 
the spectacle of public hanging. It forces a serious consideration of 
the ways in which the English responded to a criminal law that large 
numbers of them, for a wide variety of reasons, no longer could 
accept. 
The book begins with two radically different accounts of the 
hanging of a fourteen-year-old boy, John Amy Bird Bell, for the 
robbery and murder of another child (pp. 1-4). The first is a bitter, 
:fictionalized narrative written by Edward Gibbon Wakefield, an 
outspoken opponent of capital punishment (p. 2). The second is a 
"cool" report that appeared in The Times (p. 3). These very differ-
ent narratives represent for Gatrell the two different "countries" 
inha!Jited by Englishmen as they debated the morality of the gal-
lows, and neatly frame what Gatrell promises will be the questions 
addressed by the book. How did people respond to public hang-
ings? Did they worry about them? If feelings changed, how did 
they change? Did the scaffold system collapse because-of changing 
opinions? 
While the discussion of these issues is often revealing and stimu-
lating, the conclusions at which Gatrell arrives are less than earth-
19. Gatrell compares, for example, the situation in Scotland and Ireland in an effort to 
demonstrate how unusual the extensive use of capital punishment by the English was. He 
refers to the number of hangings in Scotland as "meagre" in comparison with that in England 
and to Ireland and Scotland's "relative innocence of the noose." P. 8. He claims that be-
tween 1836 and 1842, Scottish executions were "eight to ten times less than the English rate." 
P. 8 n.14. He is able to make these claims because he does not control for the relative sizes of 
these kingdoms. If "rate" is treated as the number of executions per unit of population, then 
the rate of executions in Scotland between 1836 and 1842 was not eight or ten times lower 
than in England and Wales at the same time, it was 25 to 40% lower. In 1813 to 1814, it was 
actually higher in "innocent" Ireland than it was in bloody England and Wales. Gatrell has 
demonstrated in his earlier work that he knows how to use statistics in a sophisticated way. 
His failure to do so in The Hanging Tree is clearly deliberate, and for rhetorical effect. 
20. See, e.g., G.R. Rubin, Law, Poverty and Imprisonment for Debt, 1869-1914, in LAW, 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 1750-1914: ESSAYS IN THE H1sroRY OF ENGUSH LAW 241-99 (G.R. 
Rubin & David Sugarman eds., 1984). 
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shattering. The answer to the last question is, in fact, assumed. 
Gatrell takes as given both that hanging was repudiated for reasons 
"greater than" emotional reactions to it and that those emotional 
reactions depended on material conditions that made the popula-
tion feel safe. He characterizes the other matters as factors that he 
assumes are "derivative as distinct from causative" (p. 24). Lest 
any of his readers balk at more than six hundred pages about deriv-
ative matters, Gatrell observes that "only rash historians would 
privilege material, or political, or cultural causes without interre-
lating all three" (p. 25). If legal change could not have taken place 
until material conditions made it safe enough to indulge sensibili-
ties, sensibilities affected the timing and shape of change. His ac-
count of how such emotions affected legal change is, however, 
much less full than his account of the emotions themselves. 
Gatrell depicts the "two different countries" inhabited by En-
glishmen as reflecting differing attitudes toward human nature. The 
" 'old' voices, as we may call them, though they still speak" (p. 5) 
who appealed to "retributive imperatives" are contrasted with the 
voices of men like Wakefield who refused to blind themselves to 
the greater atrocity of "cold-blooded judicial killing" (p. 6). The 
organization of the book, however, then immediately shifts focus to 
a different way of dividing the world as Gatrell looks successively at 
the reactions of the scaffold crowd, the responses of polite society, 
the involvement of a single community in a particular capital case, 
and the attitudes of the political actors who administered the sys-
tem of public hanging. 
A. The Scaffold Crowd 
By interpreting the behavior of the scaffold crowd and reading 
the plebeian texts of broadsides and ballads, Gatrell seeks to 
demonstrate that Londoners neither passively accepted the lessons 
that public hanging were intended to impart, nor attended hangings 
simply out of a spirit of ghoulishness. Instead, he concludes, hum-
ble and middling Hanoverians contemplating hanging law "steered 
a wavering course between tacitly ethical approval, sardonic and 
transgressive defiance, and mockery, sentimental anguish, or out-
right voyeurism" (p. 196). He argues that "their actions always 
made sense, even though at this remove in time, and even by the 
people themselves, precisely what sense can sometimes only be 
guessed at" (p. 196). Gatrell's account mirrors the wavering course 
he says the Hanoverians steered. Like the scaffold crowd, he takes 
his hat off to those unfairly hanged, and boos the hangmen, but as 
he steers his wavering course it is often difficult to say precisely 
what sense to make of it all. 
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Gatrell's own evidence demonstrates that the scaffold crowds 
did not oppose hanging per se. In fact, there was broad popular 
approval for some hangings (p. 104), especially when the crowd per-
ceived the victim as a social other (p. 101). Nonetheless, he argues, 
there was a "dangerous perception" that the gallows "often and 
perhaps usually symbolized an illegitimate power" (p. 104). On the 
nature of that danger, he is neither consistent, nor entirely clear.21 
Although he insists repeatedly that the authorities knew that they 
could safely hang only so many criminals a year, he systematically 
denies that the scaffold crowd had sufficient control to bring about 
change.22 
According to Gatrell, the danger embodied in the perception of 
illegitimate power could not be expressed fully at the scaffold itself. 
There, "[s]tate power determined crowd reactions" (p. 91). Gatrell 
uses this argument to attack the recent writings of Laqueur and 
others, who have emphasized the " 'carnivalesque' " qualities of 
hanging days (p. 91), contending that the scaffold was not plausibly 
a place where the world could be turned upside down.23 He asserts 
that power explains the crowd's failure to resist the authorities. It 
was state power, he insists, that caused an angry crowd protesting 
the taking of Anne Hurle to the gallows in 1804 immediately to 
become silent after being reprimanded by the sheriff (p. 97). It was 
also state power that led crowds seldom even to contemplate res-
cue, "even though many knew that 'nothing certainly could have 
been made more easy' " (p. 97). Gatrell, ironically, also invokes 
state power to explain the mayhem that did take place at execu-
tions. It reflected, he argues, the "state's olympian indifference" to 
what was after all not very threatening activity (pp. 95-96). Gatrell 
does not explain how his insistence on the significance of state 
power can be reconciled with his earlier claim that the state could 
21. Gatrell denies in the face of pretty strong evidence that the decision to stop the pro-
cession to and proceedings at Tyburn in 1783 and transfer those hangings to Newgate had 
anything to do with concerns about the crowd. See PETER LINEBAUGH, THE LONDON 
HANGED: CRIME AND CIVIL SocIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 363 (1992). Gatrell 
argues that the transfer of the gallows from Tyburn resulted from a decision to defer to the 
"high-born property developers north and east of Hyde Park." P. 96. His own discussion of 
the decision does not support that characterization. The petitions from the proprietors of 
estates near Tybum were written in the 1750s and 1760s. The two sheriffs who suggested the 
change to Lord North and Lord Chief Justice Mansfield talked only about the need to get 
better control over crowd behavior in order to insure that the hanging conveyed the appro-
priate message. See p. 96. 
22. The source of this knowledge is unexplained, and Gatrell's statistics show that the 
authorities were prepared to hang large numbers of persons during periods of turmoil or 
disruption. Seep. 8 n.14. 
23. He also insists without explanation or obvious justification that public hangings were 
not "convincingly the locus of what Burke discerns as the three major themes in carnival -
food, sex, and violence." P. 94. As he notes, on hanging days taverns opened early and 
piemen hawked their wares. See p. 94. It is not difficult to find prints that add sex and 
violence as well. See pp. 189-93. 
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not prevent the crowd from effecting a "parodic inversion" of an 
"execution's intended significance" (p. 88). 
In building his picture of the scaffold crowd, for the most part, 
Gatrell uses sources that have been used by other scholars, but in 
his extensive use of the petitions for mercy filed on behalf of per-
sons sentenced to death, he breaks new ground. He employs them 
as a window on the process by which the condemned appealed for 
mercy, and as a way of looking at one community's response to a 
criminal conviction. 
The mercy petitions developed out of one of the peculiarities of 
the unreformed English criminal law. Although capital punishment 
was the ideological cornerstone of the criminal law and the courts 
handed down many capital sentences, a relatively small proportion 
of these sentences were carried out. After 1800, more than eighty-
seven percent of all those convicted of a capital crime and sen-
tenced to death had their sentences commuted. Did this process of 
petitioning for mercy have the effect of encouraging deference and 
legitimating the law? Gatrell attempts to introduce doubt. He 
questions whether these petitions reflect "real" deference, and 
mocks a "hefty body of social historians," whom he accuses of 
stressing benign motifs.24 He recognizes that there were many real 
expressions of deference. There were old voices whose deference 
to the great and their law was habitual and reflexive (p. 214), and 
the "yeoman-to-middling kinds of people, or those who aspired to 
be like them," whose "fawning" was not dissimulated (p. 215). But 
with all of that, he reaches the entirely plausible conclusion that 
much of what appeared as deferential was in fact an instrumental 
language of free plebeians. Gatrell leaves unexplored how much 
more the Tories who defended the criminal code expected. 
A tension pervades the section of the book dealing with the 
scaffold crowd. Gatrell wants to portray the lower orders as actors 
with dangerous opinions, but their actions remain limited to an 
emotional world, and one that remains resolutely conflicted and 
confused. 
B. Reading the Polite Classes 
Historians conventionally attribute the broad shift in sensibili-
ties relating to the death penalty to growing feelings of humanity 
(pp. 226-28). It was conventional at the time, and has been conven-
tional ever since, to attribute an important role in encouraging and 
24. Turning to a footnote, we learn that the "hefty body" consists of five individuals, and 
that Gatrell is quarreling only with "the balance of emphasis" in their work. Three of them 
qualify their positions enough so that he does not intend "to parody" them. Of the other 
two, whom Gatrell apparently regards as the legitimate subjects of parody, one writes about 
the seventeenth century. See p. 213 & n.50. 
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forming that shift to a variety of middle class philanthropic reform 
efforts (p. 371). By looking at the writings of private individuals, 
persons actively involved in various reform movements, political 
radicals, and the lawyers and court officials who participated in put-
ting together mercy appeals, and by reading them through the lens 
of psychological analysis, Gatrell attempts to demonstrate the prob-
lematic nature of such conventional accounts. He probes the anxie-
ties created by the increasingly arbitrary nature of capital cases and 
the defenses that polite society erected to avoid dealing with the 
horror of hanging. He discusses the difficulty that polite society 
had in identifying with the condemned, and argues that the emotion 
that caused increasing numbers to recoil at hanging was not empa-
thy or humanity, but squeamishness (p. 267). By placing these 
"[d]ead people" "on couches ... to diagnose them Vienna-style," 
he hopes to make sense of "the strange behavioural patternings ap-
parent" in the responses of the polite classes to hanging (p. 266). 
His efforts do not call into question the conventional claim that 
there was a profound change in public attitudes toward hanging in 
the first three decades of the nineteenth century, although they do 
call into question both the depth and breadth of that change. He 
identifies the same actors as those in traditional accounts and leaves 
the usual chronology of attitucµnal shifts undisturbed. Gatrell, 
however, does challenge the conventional understanding of the 
wellsprings of that change. He minimizes the role of religion 
(p. 372), and seeks to demonstrate the shakiness of the commitment 
of the Society of Friends to reform of the criminal law (p. 405). He 
emphasizes the contributions, largely ignored by others, of those 
lawyers and court officials who took a large role in the preparing of 
mercy petitions on behalf of the condemned, and who made their 
arguments in terms of justice (pp. 417-44). He calls into question 
how much the reformers changed public opinion, and reveals that 
the reformers "exaggerated the clarity, ubiquity, and intensity of 
the public concern for which they spoke" (p. 416). If he denies the 
prison reformers and the monarch the dignity of having acted from 
the motives of selfless humanity that other historians have granted 
them, he does not deny that they played their part "in the extended 
process of social learning," or that they succeeded in framing much 
of the debate in their own terms (pp. 443-44). 
The explanatory power of this part of the book depends on the 
insightfulness of his psychological analyses of persons long dead, 
who have left fragmentary records in the idiom of another time. 
Reactions to such an enterprise are likely to vary, as are judgments 
on the skill with which Gatrell has carried it out. 
The Hanging Tree focuses on the emotions that surrounded 
hangings, but the book is at least as much about the author's own 
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emotional reactions: to hangings themselves, to a judicial system 
that imposed and defended them, to ways in which society reacted 
to them, and to the modem historian's account of the first three. 
These multiple emotional foci create powerful tensions in Gatrell's 
account. 
These tensions seriously interfere with the narrative descriptions 
of public executions that play such a large part in this book. De-
spite the fact that they are often very moving tales, there is surpris-
ingly little immediacy about them. This is not a book of rich 
description. We never feel part of the crowd at the scaffold. We do 
not smell it, or hear it, or see it. When the emotional power of the 
setting and events threatens to break through, Gatrell's own self-
consciously uncensored emotions and judgments distance the 
reader from the scene. We find ourselves focused on the author, 
not the hanging. 
For a book that has as one of its central themes the ability, or 
inability, of the polite and political classes to empathize with the 
sufferings of those condemned to die on the scaffold, The Hanging 
Tree itself demonstrates very little ability to empathize with any of 
them. In recounting the experiences of Capel Lofft and his three-
or four-week involvement with the case of Sarah Lloyd, a young 
servant girl executed at Bury St. Edmunds on April 23, 1800, 
Gatrell maintains an ironic detachment. Lofft, he tells us, achieved 
"some magnificence" through this involvement (p. 353). But if 
there was a kind of "splendour" (p. 353) in the case, Lofft himself 
emerges as slightly ridiculous. His attempt to save Sarah Lloyd's 
life, Gatrell notes, had "a kind of lunacy" about it (p. 353). It was 
the work of a man "who projected his long frustrations" upon "the 
creature he made" of Sarah Lloyd, "the victim-woman" (p. 353). 
The increasing lunacy of the man himself later confirmed the lunacy 
of his attempt, for, after the execution of Sarah Lloyd, Lofft in-
creasingly withdrew from society and his eccentricities grew 
(p. 352). 
There is at least some measure of condescending warmth in the 
ironic detachment with which Gatrell treats Lofft. Elizabeth Fry is 
too much of a social other and gets much less sympathetic treat-
ment. In describing her efforts to involve women as prison visitors, 
Gatrell notes that prison governors and prison chaplains found 
them hard to take, "and they had a point" (p. 381). It "must have 
been trying" for governors to have to put up with Fry's ladies' visit-
ing days. If Lofft projected his frustrations on Lloyd, it appears that 
Gatrell projects his on the governors. He finds Fry, and her Quaker 
sensibilities, trying, almost as trying as he finds those who have 
yielded to the temptation to beatify her (p. 371). He reads the diary 
entries of the seventeen-year-old Fry, and discovers that she had 
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learned "how to gush as well-bred girls of feeling must gush" 
(p. 393). He recoils in horror at the "disciplined denials of belief" 
with which she met the death of her four-year-old daughter 
(p. 393). He finds a "luxuriantly self-referential quality in [her] in-
stinct to good works" and appears repulsed by her account of her 
efforts to protect her sanity in the face of the hangings that she 
found so distressing (p. 394). Gatrell introduces the fact that Eliza-
beth Fry had eleven children to worry about in addition to the pris-
oners at Newgate not to demonstrate how remarkable her 
achievements were in the context of her other duties, but for the 
purpose of showing that she "did not spend more than a moiety of 
her time" at the prison (p. 404). 
In 1818, Fry tried to save the life of Harriet Skelton. Her efforts 
failed, but in the process she managed to offend the Home Secre-
tary, Viscount Sidmouth. Offending the Home Secretary was the 
sort of thing that might have made her prison reform work more 
difficult, and Fry understandably feared that she had " 'too incau-
tiously spoke[n] of some in power'" (p. 373). Gatrell cites her com-
ment as evidence that she was more upset by his coolness to her 
than by the hanging of Skelton (p. 373). Her prudential advice to 
the Ladies' Society a decade later that it was "wiser for visiting la-
dies to be quiet, and to submit to decrees, which they cannot alter" 
"unless they can bring forward decided facts in favor of the con-
demned"25 becomes proof that she "was not one to rock political 
boats" (p. 389). 
Gatrell meets in Elizabeth Fry someone whose language and 
world view was both unbearable and inaccessible, except on those 
occasions when she, like a few other "[r]are birds," managed to get 
"close to the sinner's physical terror in this world without obliterat-
ing it in obsessive references to the world to come" (p. 389). He is 
"inclined to believe" her distress and empathy when she used vo-
cabulary that was "sensationalist" and "secular" and grants that 
she, at least in that moment, succeeded in "an imaginative projec-
tion" "passing from one woman to another" (p. 389). Gatrell is 
much less sympathetic with the attempts of Fry and others to em-
pathize with the spiritual terrors of the condemned. He is not pre-
pared to dismiss such efforts as merely a defense against anxiety 
about scaffold killing (p. 374). He does, however, label them as de-
fensive "if it is agreed that belief in bodily resurrection has been the 
main denial system through which most societies have kept the fear 
of death at bay" (p. 375). Starting with the propositions that the 
spiritual language of the reformers is incomprehensible and that 
religious belief is a form of denial, he comes to the conclusion that 
25. P. 373 (quoting E. FRY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE VISITING, SUPERINTENDING, AND 
GOVERNMENT OF FEMALE PRISONERS 24 {1827)). 
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religious belief was not the driving force behind the only form of 
empathy that he considers legitimate, empathy that addresses the 
physical terror and pain of the hanged. This insight highlights ele-
ments of the work of Elizabeth Fry that other accounts submerge. 
How powerful an insight it is is open to greater doubt. 
C. Community Reactions 
Part V of the book consists of a microhistory of the rape of 
Elizabeth Cureton (pp. 447-93). The Cureton case was one of the 
biggest appeal campaigns in the 1820s, and it was this case that first 
drew Gatrell's interest in the Home Office Archives (p. 448). It 
forms the third focus of the book, the focus on the attitudes of a 
single community. 
In June 1829, in the village of Coalbrookdale in Shropshire, 
John Noden, a twenty-seven-year-old odd-job man and wheel-
wright, forced Elizabeth Cureton to have sex with him. She re-
garded the incident as a rape, and reported it to the authorities. 
The authorities agreed with her assessment. Noden was charged 
with the capital crime of rape, convicted, and sentenced to death. 
The community rallied to Noden's defense, and the judges of the 
assize court recommended him for mercy. The Home Secretary, 
Robert Peel, accepted the recommendation, and commuted 
Noden's sentence to transportation. The people of Coalbrookdale, 
however, were not satisfied. A surgeon who had intimate knowl-
edge of the parties involved launched a second appeal drive in an 
effort to get Noden a full royal pardon. Despite the clamor in 
Coalbrookdale, the presiding judge's doubts about the case, and a 
mercy petition of unprecedented size, Peel let the judgment stand. 
After spending two years in the hulks, Noden was transported to 
Bermuda. He apparently returned to Coalbrookdale from Ber-
muda some twenty years later, and died twenty years after that. 
Elizabeth Cureton apparently moved away from Coalbrookdale, 
although possibly not very far. She may have been one of the two 
persons with that name who married in nearby parishes in 1831 and 
1832. 
What are we to make of this "microhistory"? Gatrell argues 
that it "put[ s] us in touch with the lived texture of past times" 
(p. 448), and "addresses a different kind of opinion about capital 
justice from those surveyed so far" (p. 447). It is an interesting 
story, very well told, and it demonstrates the potential richness of 
the mercy petition archives. Unfortunately, it is not well integrated 
with the rest of The Hanging Tree. Gatrell observes that the 
microhistory: 
is about one community's attitudes to a woman who challenged male 
assumptions about her body's accessibility and who paid a familiar 
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not to say predictable price. It is a cruel story which feeds in to the 
long history of collective connivance in male violence against 
women .... [W]hatever was thought privately, nobody spoke of the 
capital code in this case; and the Coalbrookdale Quakers were margi-
nal players in the campaign. The audible issue was the right relations 
between men and women, to which the law failed to attend. 
[(pp. 449-50] 
Gatrell never successfully ties this microhistory of gender rela-
tionships and the rape laws back into the quite different subject of 
the capital laws. The Cureton microhistory, moreover, appears to 
stand as a challenge to many of the themes that Gatrell seeks to 
develop. Though Gatrell generally assumes that the function of the 
criminal law was the protection of property and social privilege 
(p. 515), here the law becomes a vehicle to challenge male, and ap-
parently community, assumptions about male access to a woman's 
body. The community reaction to the Noden case appears to have 
been motivated not by hostility to capital punishment, or even to 
capital punishment for this type of crime, but rather out of a belief 
that Noden was not guilty of the substantive offense charged.26 The 
much larger and more extensive second mercy petition did not even 
relate to hanging. It was a plea that Noden not be punished at all. 
Indeed, despite the harsh tone of the comments quoted above, 
Gatrell concludes later that Peel's comments on the case were 
"roughly right" (p. 491). Noden supporters submitted substantial 
new evidence in two appeals, but it consisted chiefly of affidavits 
about the prosecutrix's prior sexual experience, none of which were 
legally admissible (pp. 488-92). Nonetheless, in his closing com-
ments on the case, Gatrell calls Noden "the victim of his times," 
who was neither released nor retried despite the "unsound[ness]" 
of the verdict against him (p. 492). Gatrell never bridges the gap 
between this view of Noden's conviction as unsound and his earlier 
view that Noden really raped Elizabeth Cureton but escaped more 
severe punishment because of the law's connivance in male vio-
lence against women. 
Perhaps this microhistory helps to explain why many English-
men steered the wavering course that they did. The emotions gen-
erated by the scaffold were powerful, but not easily channeled. 
They even may have increased the difficulty of developing an alter-
native coherent vision of criminal law that might have enabled com-
munities to challenge the status quo. The people of Coalbrookdale 
appear not to have been motivated by any strong sense about capi-
tal punishment or about whether it could be applied appropriately 
26. Gatrell's account does not make clear whether the people of Coalbrookdale disbe-
lieved Elizabeth Cureton's account or felt that the conduct she described did not amount to 
rape, though his reference to "male assumptions about her body's accessibility" suggests that 
he believes it was the latter. P. 449. 
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in cases of rape. Rather, they believed that in this particular case 
the justice system had gotten it wrong. They, like the scaffold 
crowd, reacted to individual cases, not with some general theory of 
law or punishment, but with what were probably conflicting, un-
resolved, and possibly even irreconcilable views. Informed by such 
views, and buffeted by strong emotions, they might have had no 
choice but to steer a wavering course. 
III. THEN AND Now 
Gatrell's book is not simply a history of emotions, as he suggests 
at one point (p. ix), but also a description of the functioning of the 
criminal justice system. It is to that facet of his account that we now 
turn, and to the question of how much the present differs from the 
past recounted in The Hanging Tree. Although a full evaluation of 
the contemporary criminal justice system is obviously beyond the 
scope of a book review, we want to note some disturbing contempo-
rary parallels to Gatrell's observations about the criminal trial and 
appellate process and the selection of the individuals who are exe-
cuted by the state. Gatrell's account reveals that fact-finding at 
capital trials was not very reliable, that the mercy appeals process 
did not provide relief even when evidence of guilt was questionable 
or the trial was not conducted fairly, and that the process that re-
prieved most capital prisoners and selected a few to be executed 
was standardless and capricious. These fundamental problems per-
sist to a greater degree than we like to acknowledge in the contem-
porary American legal system. 
A. Criminal Trials: The Adequacy of the Determination of Guilt, 
Innocence, and the Proper Sentence 
A mechanism for accurate fact-finding is an essential element of 
a fair system of criminal justice, and the Anglo-American legal sys-
tem historically has employed the adversarial trial to perform this 
function. Gatrell's description of criminal trials in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries depicts a system that failed to meet rudi-
mentary standards of fairness and failed as well to ensure the accu-
racy of verdicts. Trials were incredibly brief. For example, the 
Noden rape case was heard at the Shrewsbury assize, where a dozen 
cases, seven of which yielded death sentences, were tried in two 
days (p. 536). · Trials in the Old Bailey were even more rapid, with 
noncapital cases taking an average of only eight and a half min-
utes.27 Gatrell concludes that innocent defendants had little chance 
of an acquittal in these slapdash affairs. Most defendants had no 
27. See p. 536. Gatrell also notes Beattie's estimate of an average trial duration of 30 
minutes per case, all formalities included, for cases in Surrey in the late eighteenth century. 
Seep. 536. 
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counsel to assist them. For example, two-thirds to three-quarters of 
those tried for property offenses in the Old Bailey in 1800 went 
unrepresented (p. 537). Even when defense counsel were available, 
they played a very restricted role; before 1836 they were not per-
mitted to address the jury in felony cases (p. 534). An accused 
might languish for months in prison before trial, maldng it difficult 
if not impossible to mount an effective defense (p. 534). Often key 
evidence or character witnesses in the defendant's favor were not 
heard, because the authorities made little effort to ensure that de-
fense witnesses were present for the trial, even in capital cases 
(p. 538). As for the judges, Gatrell depicts th.em as either openly 
hostile to defendants or preoccupied by matters other than the 
cases before them, making a mockery of the legal fiction that the 
judge acted as the prisoner's friend (p. 535). 
Most readers unfamiliar. with the criminal justice system proba-
bly assume that the picture Gatrell paints is just a feature of our 
benighted past, like imprisonment for debt or prosecution of 
witches. In the United States, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
right to trial by jury, to compulsory process to secure the presence 
of defense witnesses, and to the effective assistance of defense 
counsel. Indeed, in the wake of the televised trials of O.J. Simpson 
and the Menendez brothers, each of which took many months, one 
might conclude that the criminal justice system now devotes exces-
sive resources to the trial process. 
In fact, the Simpson and Menendez trials were wildly unrepre-
sentative. Notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment, the right to trial 
itself (and thus all of the associated trial rights) is imperiled in our 
own overcrowded urban courts. This is particularly true in the New 
York City Criminal Court. In 1990 there were trials in only 973 of 
the 213,000 cases filed in that court.28 In 99.6% of the cases there 
was no trial, and the researcher who studied the court concluded 
that "[t]he Sixth Amendment right has become little more than a 
phrase, uttered as part of the threat ritual engaged in by the judge, 
the prosecutor and defense attorney as they prepare cases for dis-
position by plea or dismissal."29 Throughout the United States it is 
estimated that eighty to ninety percent of cases - including murder 
cases - are disposed of by plea bargain, without trial.30 Even if we 
28. See- HARRY I. SuaIN, THE NEW YoRK CrrY CRIMINAL CouRT: THE CASE FOR Aao-
UTION 4 (1992). 
29. Id. at 5. 
30. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE 
W. REs. L. REv. 1, 11 (1995) (citing Margot Garey, Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: 
Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1246-47 (1985)). Ap-
proximately 58% of the defendants charged with felonies in the 75 largest counties in the 
United States in 1990 eventually pied guilty, 7% were convicted after a trial, and 1 % were 
acquitted; the remaining cases were dismissed, diverted from the criminal justice system, or 
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assume that contemporary trials are far fairer than those depicted 
by Gatrell, there is still a troubling question of the fairness of the 
vast bulk of contemporary convictions, that result from guilty pleas 
after plea bargaining.31 
The picture is somewhat different in capital cases, because they 
generally go to trial, but here again the data challenge any easy 
assumption that our recognition of constitutional rights ensures the 
fairness and the accuracy of the verdicts. In capital cases the most 
significant threat to the fairness and reliability of the resulting con-
victions and capital sentences is the inadequate representation pro-
vided for indigent defendants. A blue-ribbon Task Force from the 
American Bar Association concluded in 1990 that inadequate rep-
resentation in capital cases is a pervasive problem that calls for fun-
damental structural reforms.32 Witnesses before the Task Force 
"described the current state of affairs for indigent criminal defend-
ants as 'scandalous,' 'shameful,' 'abysmal,' 'pathetic,' 'deplorable,' 
and 'at best, exceedingly uneven.' "33 The Task Force found capital 
cases that had been "marred" by inadequate representation "rang-
ing from virtually no representation at all by counsel, to representa-
tion by inexperienced counsel, to failures to investigate basic 
threshold questions, to lack of knowledge of governing law, to lack 
of advocacy on the issue of guilt, to failure to present a case for life 
at tb.e penalty phase."34 The Task Force concluded "[w]ithout any 
adjudication was deferred. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, at 536 Table 5.66. 
31. When there is no trial, parties in theory can explore matters of both factual and legal 
guilt through the process of investigation by the parties and plea negotiations. Most states 
now give the defense at least a limited right to pretrial discovery, and procedural rules in 
most states also require a finding that there is a factual basis before a guilty plea may be 
accepted. The question then is how well these procedures work and whether we truly have 
reduced the number of cases in which the innocent are convicted. There is a substantial 
literature on the subject of guilty pleas and plea bargaining. For a range of views on the 
fairness and desirability of plea bargaining and the degree to which it protects innocent de-
fendants, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE 
LJ. 1969 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 
(1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1949-66 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect 
Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE LJ. 2011 (1992). 
32. See TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS, AMERICAN BAR AssoCIA-
TION, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW JN STATE DEATH PEN· 
ALTY CASES 7 (1990) [hereinafter ABA BACKGROUND REPORT] ("[The] principal failings of 
the capital punishment review process today are the inadequacy and inadequate compensa-
tion of counsel at trial and the unavailability of counsel in state post-conviction proceed-
ings."). The Task Force's Background Report provides material supporting this 
recommendation. Id. at 49-56. 
33. Id. at 55 (footnote omitted). Similarly, a recent Note surveyed the state of death-
penalty defense representation in 1994 and found it "appalling." Note, The Eighth Amend-
ment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1940 
(1994). 
34. ABA BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 32, at 52-53 (footnotes omitted). Although 
these examples were all taken from Georgia, the Task Force reported that representation was 
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doubt," that the inadequacy of representation "increases the risk of 
convictions that are flawed by fundamental factual, legal, or consti-
tutional error."35 Mistakes by counsel have led to the execution of 
one codefendant while the other obtained relief on an issue present 
in both cases.36 A former U.S. Supreme Court law clerk com-
mented that "the death penalty frequently results from nothing 
more than poverty and poor lawyering."37 As Sister Helen Prejean 
learned when counseling Louisiana death row inmates, '"you're 
never going to find a rich person on death row."'38 
B. The Appeals Process as a Mechanism for Correcting 
Procedural Errors and Avoiding the Execution of 
Innocent Defendants 
A second important element of a system of criminal justice is a 
mechanism for review to correct procedural errors and to avoid the 
punishment of persons who are not factually guilty. Although this 
function is important in all criminal cases, it is most significant in 
the case of erroneous capital sentences. As described earlier in this 
review,39 Gatrell paints a bleak picture of the English mercy ap-
peals for capital and noncapital cases. 
At first blush, our system bears little or no relationship to the 
discretionary and essentially standardless appeal process Gatrell 
describes. We have a highly formalized, multitiered process for 
postconviction review in capital cases. Capital cases now represent 
a significant part of the caseload of many courts. It has been esti-
mated, for example, that death penalty cases consume one-third of 
the time of the Florida Supreme Court40 and one-half of the time of 
the justices on the California Supreme Court.41 If state appeals fail, 
defendants may raise constitutional claims in federal court on peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus, and in many cases successive federal 
habeas petitions are filed. Historically, federal habeas review has 
not necessarily any better in other states. Id. at 54. For example, in Tennessee defense law-
yers offered no mitigating evidence in about one-quarter of all death penalty cases affirmed 
by the state supreme court. Id. 
35. Id. at 55. 
36. See id. at 54 & n.152, citing Stanley v. Kemp, 737 F2d 921 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 
Note, supra note 33, at 1924 & nn.7-10. 
37. Clifford M. Sloan, High Court's Handling of Death Cases, FULTON COUNTY DAILY 
REP., Mar. 25, 1987, at 2, 3, quoted in ABA BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 32, at 51. See 
generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE LJ. 1835 (1994). 
38. HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE DEATii 
PENALTY IN TiiE UNITED STAES 49 (1993); see also Bright, supra note 37, at 1835. 
39. See supra part I.C. 
40. See Kozinski, supra note 30, at 3 n.10 (citing Robert Sherrill, Death Row on Trial, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1983, § 6 (Magazine) at 80, 112). 
41. See Figuratively Speaking, 81 A.B.A. J. 37, 37 (1995). 
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provided a substantial additional measure of protection in death 
penalty cases. Seventy percent of habeas corpus petitions in death 
penalty cases decided by the federal courts between 1976 and 1983 
resulted in the reversal of the defendant's conviction, or sentence, 
or both.42 The process of postconviction review is complex,43 
42. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
43. Judge Alex Kozinski has described the typical postconviction review of a capital case 
as follows: 
Post-trial proceedings begin with a mandatory appeal (everywhere except Arkansas and 
federal court), usually to the state supreme court. If the California Supreme Court is 
any indication, these appeals are backed up. The California Supreme Court generally 
decides no more than three-quarters of the death cases it receives annually, and cur-
rently has slightly more than 200 death cases pending, half of which are on hold because 
the state has been unable to find lawyers willing and able to take them •..• 
In order to be eligible for federal habeas, our inmate must first avail himself of state 
post-conviction remedies and collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in state 
court. Assuming his guilt and penalty trials were impeccable, he loses. He then peti-
tions the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which is denied. 
At some point, a death warrant is issued, which is often the signal for starting federal 
habeas proceedings. A federal stay of execution is entered while this first petition is 
considered, and although the district court can make a decision in as little as three 
months, it can take more than two years if the court decides to hold extensive eviden-
tiary hearings, which is not at all unusual. The inmate then appeals the district court's 
decision, which keeps the stay of execution in place. In a death case involving a first 
habeas petition, it is fairly typical to consume a year on the appeal, although two years 
or more certainly is not unheard of. While our inmate loses this appeal, he inevitably 
petitions for rehearing and suggests rehearing en bane. At least in the Ninth Circuit, this 
guarantees a vote on whether to go en bane, which adds a few more weeks to the proce-
dure. Our inmate then petitions the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certio-
rari, and for the second time his petition is denied. 
In this streamlined version of events, we now stand poised for execution - maybe. 
The case has been reviewed at four levels of the state and federal courts and the United 
States Supreme Court has twice passed up the opportunity to jump in. The federal stay 
of execution is then lifted, and the case goes back to the state court where the govern-
ment will obtain a death warrant setting a new execution date. 
With an execution date in place, the petitioner's lawyers go into high gear to raise 
some issue that will forestall the execution. They might seek collateral relief (and a stay 
of execution) in state court. But, more likely, they will file a successive federal habeas 
petition. In the Ninth Circuit, the district court can enter a stay while the new issues 
raised by this petition are considered; if it refuses a stay, the appellate panel assigned to 
the case can enter one; and if execution is imminent, any single judge of the circuit can 
enter a temporary stay. Any federal stay entered can remain in effect until long after the 
putative execution date. 
Often this successive federal petition will raise unexhausted claims, which may get 
shipped off to state court, with the federal stay intact. Otherwise, in this hypothetical, 
squeaky-clean case, the district court reaches a decision against the defendant. In the 
Ninth Circuit, a panel of three court of appeals judges is standing by and has been re-
ceiving the briefs at the same time as the district court. When an execution is pending, 
the Supreme Court also gets papers in the case as they are filed in the lower federal 
courts. Unique to the Ninth Circuit, there is also an eleven-judge en bane panel standing 
by. If the three-judge panel refuses to issue a stay of execution or a certification of 
probable cause, any active judge of the circuit can force an expedited en bane vote by 
simply requesting it. There are close to thirty active judges in the Ninth Circuit and, 
without exception, one of them will seek en bane reconsideration. The en bane panel 
meets to consider the case, rules against the petitioner, and dissolves the stay of execu-
tion. Within hours, sometimes within minutes, the petitioner's lawyers are before the 
Supreme Court with a stay petition. The Justices are polled, often at home and occasion-
ally woken from sleep, and they deny the stay. This usually signals the end of the 
process. 
Kozinski, supra note 30, at 6-10. 
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lengthy,44 and expensive.45 
Unfortunately, despite the countless dollars and hours expended 
on postconviction review of capital cases, our legal system has not 
solved one of the fundamental problems that confronted Robert 
Peel. There are still nagging doubts whether some of the defend-
ants who are executed would have been convicted and sentenced to 
death had all of the evidence amassed on appeal been presented at 
the trial. 
There are numerous reasons for our continued inability to put 
to rest doubts about the accuracy of the verdicts and sentences im-
posed on those condemned to die. The deficiencies of counsel for 
indigent defendants continue to play a significant role at this stage, 
in two respects. In the first place, there is no assurance that a 
death-sentenced inmate will have competent counsel at the post-
conviction stage.46 Even more important, it is often impossible for 
even highly skilled counsel at the postconviction stage to remedy 
defense counsel's failures at the trial level. Failures at the trial level 
literally can be fatal because the constitutional standard for ade-
quacy of counsel is extremely low,47 and the defendant generally is 
deemed to have defaulted on claims his counsel did not raise at 
trial. 
The restricted scope of review presently available in the federal 
courts now serves as a substantial barrier to redressing the failures 
of the trial system by postconviction review. As Professors Carol 
and Jordan Steiker have explained: 
44. The average time for postconviction review of a capital case is 10 years, and it is rare 
for the review process to be completed in less than seven years. See Kozinski, supra note 30, 
at 10. 
45. A number of studies of the cost of the death penalty are collected in Kozinski, supra 
note 30, at 11 n.45. For a discussion of the costs of the death penalty, see id. at 11-16; PHIUP 
J. COOK & DONNA B. SLAWSON, THE Cosrs OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH 
CAROLINA (1993). 
46. The ABA's Task Force noted that "[f]ailures of counsel are also not uncommon on 
appeal," and found that "[o]ften the lawyer on post-conviction review ... is completely una-
ware of a whole body of applicable law." ABA BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 32, at 56-
57. It also found that many of the lawyers appointed to represent indigents in postconviction 
review "are totally ignorant of habeas corpus law and procedure and make little or no at-
tempt to learn." Id. at 57. The mistakes made by these attorneys "either complicate or delay 
post-conviction review or deprive their clients of meaningful review." Id. at 58. The Task 
Force also concluded that "there is a grave crisis in the lack of counsel to handle capital cases 
in post-conviction proceedings." Id. at 57; see also supra note 43. 
47. For a discussion of the inadequacy of the prevailing standard for the adequacy of 
counsel, see, for example, Bright, supra note 37, at 1857-66; William S. Geimer, A Decade of 
Strickland Tm Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel 4 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Co'unsel" in 
the Sixth Amendment, 18 lowA L. REV. 433 (1993); Ellen Kreitzberg, Death Without Justice, 
1995 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 485; Panel Discussion: The Death of Fairness? Counsel Compe-
tency and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Haus. L. REV. 1105 (1994); Note, supra 
note 33. 
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Under the [Supreme] Court's current doctrine, states need not pro-
vide any postconviction proceedings in criminal cases, including capi-
tal cases. In addition, the Court has recognized that this "greater" 
power to deny any mechanism for postconviction relief permits a state 
to exercise the "lesser" power of denying counsel to indigent inmates 
should the state choose to establish collateral proceedings. Capital 
defendants likewise fare no better than other defendants in federal 
habeas proceedings. Over the past fifteen years, the Court has im-
posed ... virtually insurmountable bars to claims defaulted in state 
court, same-claim and new-claim successive petitions, and claims 
seeking the benefit of "new" law. These bars apply equally to 
death-sentenced inmates, with the result that an increasing number of 
these inmates' constitutional claims are rejected on procedural 
grounds. Given that constitutional rights are no more effective than 
their means of enforcement, the Court's "equal" treatment of capital 
and non-capital defendants in postconviction proceedings has the ef-
fect of diluting whatever "heightened reliability" is sought by other 
death-penalty doctrines.48 
In capital cases the Supreme Court's rulings bar federal relief 
not only for procedural errors that would otherwise require reversal 
of the conviction and capital sentence49 but also for colorable 
claims of factual innocence. If a procedural default is deemed to 
have occurred, a capital habeas petitioner who claims to be inno-
cent must show - at a minimum - that it is "more likely than not 
that no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty" at an 
error-free trial.50 The current restrictions on the scope of habeas 
review for capital defendants provide an eerie parallel to Gatrell's 
conclusion that the English mercy appeals process did not provide a 
full pardon unless the defendant's evidence was "overwhelming" 
(p. 207). 
Does the restriction of federal habeas review mean that inno-
cent persons are being executed for crimes they did not commit? It 
is impossible to know with certainty whether there are innocent 
persons currently on death row, and academics hotly debate the 
question whether any demonstrably innocent persons have been ex-
48. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on 1Wo 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 399-400 
(1995) (footnotes omitted). 
49. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding that capital petitioner's 
failure to raise Massiah claim in first habeas petition constituted abuse of the writ that barred 
review, although the district court had found that the claim was supported by evidence and 
warranted habeas relief). 
. 50. Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 867 (1995). This standard applies when a claim of 
actual innocence is coupled with a claim of procedural error in violation of the Constitution. 
An even more demanding standard is applicable when the claim of actual innocence stands 
alone, or when the claim is that the defendant does not deserve the death penalty but is guilty 
of the offense. See 115 S. Ct. at 860-69. 
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ecuted in recent years.51 However, our experience in noncapital 
cases strongly supports the view that the conviction of innocent per-
sons is more than simply a "ghostly phantom" haunting the criminal 
justice system.52 The development of new scientific techniques has 
permitted the reexamination of key physical evidence, leading to 
the exoneration in recent years of as many as twenty defend~ts 
who had been serving long prison sentences for crimes they did not 
commit.53 The Cardozo Law School's Innocence Project has used 
DNA evidence to exonerate and secure the release of eight persons, 
most of whom were convicted on the basis of the eyewitness testi-
mony of one or more witnesses who sincerely were convinced of the 
defendant's guilt.54 There is no reason to believe that good-faith 
errors like those which led to the erroneous convictions of'the de-
fendants freed by the Innocence Project could not occur in capital 
cases as well. Moreover, there will not always be scientific evidence 
available to establish the innocence of a defendant who has been 
wrongly convicted. The criminal justice system has made, and pre-
sumably will continue to make, some errors, including some false 
positives. The demonstration in the DNA cases that innocent de-
fendants are still being convicted forces us to confront squarely the 
moral issue whether the execution of some innocent defendants is 
acceptable.55 
C. The Overall Fairness of the Selection of Individuals 
To Be Executed 
One of the most disquieting aspects of the English criminal jus-
tice system was the haphazard quality of the proceedings from be-
ginning to end. Because trials were slapdash affairs and the mercy 
51. Compare MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CON-
VJCllONS IN CAPITAL CASES 271 (1992) (as many as 23 innocent persons have been executed 
in the United States in this century) with Stephen J_ Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting 
the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1988). For an 
impassioned defense of the innocence of one Florida death row inmate and an indictment of 
the inability of the legal system to provide relief, see Michael Mello, Death and His Lawyers: 
Why Joseph Spaziano Owes His Life to the Miami Herald - And Not to Any Defense Law-
yer or Judge, 20 VT. L REv. 19 (1995). 
52. DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925) (Learned Hand's warning 
that "a ghostly phantom of the innocent man falsely accused" can prevent the enforcement of 
the criminal law). 
53. See Paula Span, Innocence Project Fights Injustice with DNA Testing, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 14, 1994, at Cl (15 to 20 inmates across the United States have been exonerated by 
DNA testing). 
54. See id. 
55. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABIUTY OF 
CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981). 
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appeals process little better, there was a random quality to the se-
lection of those individuals who actually were executed.56 
In contrast we have acknowledged that such arbitrariness is con-
stitutionally unacceptable with regard to capital sentencing. Most 
readers will be familiar with the broad outlines of the Supreme 
Court's modem rulings on capital punishment, beginning with the 
Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia.57 Furman had the ef-
fect of invalidating every existing capital punishment statute in the 
nation under the Eighth Amendment, thus bringing about a nation-
wide moratorium on executions. The Court announced the result in 
Furman in a brief per curiam opinion without any supporting expla-
nation, and each of the nine Justices wrote separately in opinions 
that occupy more than two hundred pages in the United States Re-
ports. Justices Marshall and Brennan concluded that the death pen-
alty was incompatible with evolving concepts of human decency and 
thus cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment,58 but their approach did not command a majority in Furman, 
and it has never done so. The three additional votes necessary to 
invalidate the death sentences before the Court were provided by 
Justices Stewart, Douglas, and White, who concluded that the sen-
tencing procedures - rather than the sanction of death itself -
were constitutionally defective.59 These three Justices articulated 
an understanding of the Eighth Amendment that has guided consti-
tutional litigation for the past two decades. Their views were later 
summarized by another plurality in Gregg v. Georgia: 
Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it 
could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a sub-
stantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. Mr. Justice White concluded that "the death penalty is ex-
acted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and 
. . . there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in 
which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Indeed, 
the death sentences examined by the Court in Furman were "cruel 
56. Perhaps the most memorable example in The Hanging Tree is the clash between 
George IV and Peel over a group of men who had been convicted of burglary in 1822. See 
pp. 554-64. The King's Council considered the crimes of eight of the burglars serious, and 
Peel wanted them all hanged. See p. 555. The King dug his heels in with regard to four of the 
prisoners who were young, whose prosecutors, jurymen, or victims had petitioned against 
their execution, and whose "lapses from respectability could be encased within exonerating 
narratives." P. 558. After initially accepting Peel's argument that no significant distinctions 
could be drawn among the eight, the King changed his mind, insisting that there must be 
grounds to reprieve them. In a process that Gatrell compares to an auction, the Cabinet 
reached a unanimous compromise: instead of hanging eight men as Peel wished or only four 
as the King wished, six of the eight would be hanged. See p. 560. The King acceded, six were 
hanged, and two seventeen-year-olds were respited. See p. 560. 
57. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
58. See 408 U.S. at 305, 360. 
59. See 408 U.S. at 256-57, 310, 312-13. 
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and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel 
and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of [capital crimes], many 
just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners [in Furman were] among 
a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of 
death has in fact been imposed. . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death 
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly 
and so freakishly imposed."60 
In Gregg the swing voters - now Justices Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens, who had succeeded Douglas - concluded that "the concerns 
expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted 
statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate 
information and guidance."61 
Since the decision in Furman in 1976, the Supreme Court has 
decided scores of death penalty cases and the lower federal courts 
have decided hundreds more. Substantial judicial and societal re-
sources have been expended on the effort to administer the capital 
punishment system in accordance with the basic standard articu-
lated in Furman and Gregg. Unfortunately, there are unmistakable 
signs that we have been unable to keep the promises of Furman and 
Gregg, and that we continue to enforce the death penalty in a way 
that could be described as freakish - like being hit by lightning. 
More than 5,000 persons have been sentenced to death since 1976, 
and of that number only 302 have been executed;62 it would be dif-
ficult if not impossible to find a knowledgeable observer who be-
lieves that those who actually were executed were the persons 
whose acts were the most heinous. No single factor is responsible 
for the persistence of arbitrariness in the application of the death 
penalty, and there is no simple solution. 
Ironically, some of the arbitrariness appears to be an unin-
tended product of the reforms set in motion by Furman and its 
progeny. Furman required every state to employ the model of 
guided jury discretion in capital sentencing as the principal means 
of avoiding arbitrariness. The initial empirical data gathered by the 
National Science Foundation's Capital Jury Project indicate that ju-
rors have a poor understanding of their task in the capital sentenc-
ing phase. For example, contrary to the law of their states, four out 
60. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1986) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, 
JJ.) (citing Funnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted)). 
61. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. 
62. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FuND, INc., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 
REPORTER 859 (Fall 1995). In addition to the 3,046 inmates currently on death row and the 
302 that have been executed, 1,480 death row inmates have had their convictions or death 
sentences reversed, 72 have had their death sentences commuted, and 138 have died of natu-
ral causes, committed suicide, or been killed. See id. 
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of ten capital jurors erroneously believed they were required to im-
pose the death penalty if they found the aggravating factor that the 
defendant's crime was heinous, vile, or depraved.63 A related find-
ing by the Capital Jury Project is that the guided discretion statutes 
have tended to diminish and perhaps even displace the jurors' sense 
of responsibility for the punishment they impose by "appearing to 
provide them with an authoritative formula that yields the 'correct' 
or 'required' punishment."64 The Supreme Court recognized the 
significance of such confusion with its comment that an "uncor-
rected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determina-
tion of death will rest with others presents an intolerable danger 
that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its 
role. "65 Of course, both of these errors bias the jury in favor of 
capital punishment. 
The process of postconviction review also becomes a kind of 
Catch 22: though it is intended to ensure procedural regularity and 
to prevent the execution of any defendant whose guilt has not been 
established, it introduces another source of arbitrariness into the 
selection of the individuals who actually are executed. Success or 
failure in obtaining relief turns on matters such as whether a proce-
dural default by counsel bars raising an issue that otherwise might 
warrant relief. Some factually guilty capital defendants, whose 
deeds may rank among the most heinous, obtain relief, at least for a 
time, because of procedural errors committed at the trial level or 
the exceptional abilities of counsel who specialize in postconviction 
review. Others, whose guilt is less certain or whose crimes are less 
heinous, are executed because they cannot identify a constitutional 
error at their trial or their claims are barred by procedural default 
on the part of their lawyers. Finally, the cases of many others re-
main in limbo, sometimes for years, because of the overcrowded 
dockets of particular courts or the unavailability of counsel for the 
defendant in the particular case. 
There are also other even more troubling factors at work in the 
selection between those sentenced to die and those actually exe-
cuted that are the product of inequalities in our society. As noted 
63. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of 
Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1091 (1995). More than three·quarters of the jurors re-
ported that the state had proved the existence of the aggravating factor in the case before 
them. See id. Although the jurors were not asked this question directly, it appears that as 
many as one-third believed that they were required to impose the death penalty in the case 
before them, when in fact state law clearly made such a determination discretionary. See id. 
at 1091-92. 
64. Id. at 1093; see also Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the Buck? - Juror Misperception of 
Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137 (1995); Austin Sarat, Vio-
lence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. 
L.J. 1103 (1995). 
65. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985). 
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above,66 in many cases indigent defendants do not have adequate 
counsel. The adequacy of counsel has such a powerful impact on 
the imposition of the death penalty that these defendants are, in 
effect, executed because of their poverty, not the heinousness of 
their offenses. Perhaps equally troubling, the continuing specter of 
racial prejudice and stereotyping hangs over the system, despite 
some notable improvements. This problem is not unique to capital 
sentencing. As one scholar concluded after an extensive review of 
scores of empirical studies: 
Over the period of three decades, researchers have carefully 
demonstrated persistent, though idiosyncratic, bias in outcomes at 
every level of the criminal justice system .... [T]he mos~ important of 
these studies ... demonstrated likely bias in crime reporting, arrest-
ing, and pretrial treatment. Bias was further demonstrated through-
out the courts themselves. Prosecutorial bias, grand jury bias, and 
sentencing bias were profoundly clear. Bias persisted despite exami-
nations of court performance from several perspectives. Attitudinal, 
organizational, community, environmental, and decisional perspec-
tives all presented similar results.67 
There is substantial evidence that racial prejudice taints the admin-
istration of the death penalty.68 In 1990 the General Accounting 
Office reviewed twenty-eight studies conducted by twenty-one sets 
of researchers and concluded that the studies show "a pattern of 
evidence indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, 
and imposition of the death penalty after the Furman decision."69 
In testimony before Congress, a GAO expert concluded, "[t]he re-
sults show a strong race of the victim influence: the death penalty 
sentence was more likely to be sought and imposed for an offender 
if the victim was white."70 
66. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
67. GREGORY D. RUSSELL, THE DEATH PENALTY AND RACIAL BIAS: OVERTURNING 
SUPREME COURT ASSUMPTIONS 69 (1994). 
68. See generally SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); RUSSELL, supra note 67; David c. 
Baldus et al., Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons 
from Georgia, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1375 (1985); Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Pat-
terns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DA VIS L. REv. 1327 (1985); William J. Bowers, 
The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Funnan Statutes, 14 J. 
CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067 (1983); Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location 
of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 754 (1983); Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death 
Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1409 (1985). 
69. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE JUDICIARY 
CoMMnTEES, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
SENTENCING 5 (1990). 
70. Statement of Lowell Dodge, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, GAO, before 
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (May 
3, 1990), quoted in Walter L. Gordon III, Death Penalty: National Disaster Visits California, 
33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 283, 293 (1993). 
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Despite the disturbing implications of these studies, the 
Supreme Court has held that statistical data· of the death penalty's 
disparate impact is not sufficient to establish a constitutional viola-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause or the Eighth Amendment. 
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 71 the Court assumed the validity of a study 
:finding that Georgia defendants charged with killing white victims 
were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than those 
charged with killing blacks, and black Georgia defendants were 1.1 
times more likely to receive the death sentence than other defend-
ants, even after the researchers had accounted for the effects of 230 
other variables.72 Five members of the Court held that this statisti-
cal evidence of unexplained racial disparity in the application of the 
death penalty did not demonstrate intentional discrimination in any 
particular case, and thus did not establish an equal protection viola-
tion.73 Noting the many procedural protections now available to 
capital defendants,74 and emphasizing the importance of discretion 
in the application of the death penalty and in the criminal justice 
system as a whole,75 the Court concluded that the defense evidence 
did not "demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias 
affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process."76 
Although the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitu-
tional doctrine, its decision did nothing to challenge the conclusion 
that the death penalty is being applied inequitably and arbitrarily-
if not unconstitutionally.77 Perhaps it is inevitable that prejudice 
will infect the discretionary sentencing determination required 
under Furman and Gregg. Welsh White believes that: 
most knowledgeable observers agree that the switch to post-Furman 
statutes had only a minimal effect on racial discrimination in capital 
sentencing. Perhaps the most significant reason for this is that racial 
prejudice is a powerful force that may not be easily extirpated by stat-
utory or verbal formulas. . . . Some of the findings required - for 
example, whether the murder was committed by torture or whether 
the defendant is likely to present a future danger to the community -
involve guidelines that are so vague that they restrain the sentencer's 
71. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
72. See 481 U.S. at 287, 291 n.7. 
73. See 481 U.S. at 291-99. 
74. See 481 U.S. at 309-10 & n.30. 
75. See 481 U.S. at 297. 
76. 481 U.S. at 313 (citation omitted). 
77. For critiques of the Mccleskey holding, see, e.g, WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PEN· 
ALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISH· 
MENT 135-63 (1991); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, 
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1388 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 
(1987); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 COR· 
NELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. 
REv. 119, 158 (1987-88). 
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discretion only slightly. Furthermore, most of the post-Furman stat-
utes require the sentencer to make the ultimate death penalty deci-
sion by weighing the aggravating factors or circumstances against the 
mitigating ones, leaving it to the sentencer to decide exactly what 
weight each factor should be given. Thus, despite the guidelines, the 
sentencing authority still has vast discretion to make what is essen-
tially a moral judgment. The new statutes have simply not altered the 
sentencer's role in a way that would be expected to curb the effect of 
racial prejudice.78 
D. An Impossible Task Made Worse? 
This Part has suggested that certain features of American cul-
ture, law, and judicial procedure deeply flaw the contemporary sys-
tem of capital punishment and prevent its fair and rational 
administration. There is, however, another possibility, which is that 
the difficulty lies much deeper. In 1971, less than one year before 
the decision in Furman, Justice Harlan argued that it is a task "be-
yond present human ability" "[t]o identify before the fact those 
characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which 
call for the death penalty, and to express those characteristics in 
language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sen-
tencing authority."79 Justice Harlan's opinion suggests that much of 
the post-Furman effort to regulate the death penalty was doomed 
to failure, and indeed may have made things worse. Perhaps "the 
death penalty cannot be rationalized, however hard and in good 
faith we try,"80 because of "'the inevitably unsystematic, ir-
reducibly personal moral elements of the choice to administer the 
death penalty.' "81 As Robert Weisberg has explained: 
The "problem" of capital punishment is a simple two fold truth: Capi-
tal punishment is at once the best and worst subject for legal rules. 
The state's decision to kill is so serious, and the cost of error so high, 
that we feel impelled to discipline the human power of the death sen-
tence with rational legal rules. Yet a judge or jury's decision to kill is 
an intensely moral, subjective matter that seems to defy the designers 
of general formulas for legal decision.82 
If we accept this view of the problem, there is reason to think 
that the efforts of the past two decades to guide the discretion of 
juries in capital sentencing and to articulate the legal rules gov-
78. WHITE, supra note 77, at 137-38. For a review of the evidence of jury bias in death 
penalty cases, a discussion of the mechanisms by which such bias might affect the sentencing 
process, and an effort to measure empirically the relationship between support for the death 
penalty and racial bias, see RusseLL, supra note 67. 
79. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971). 
80. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 48, at 413. 
81. Id. at 412-13 (quoting Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. Cr. Rev. 305, 
393). 
82. Weisberg, supra note 81, at 308. 
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erning capital cases actually may have increased the arbitrariness in 
the system by deluding jurors and judges about the role they are 
expected to play, allowing them the illusion that the life and death 
decision they make is.controlled fully by law.83 Indeed, the Capital 
Jury Project's initial research has found evidence that a significant 
percentage of capital jurors misunderstand their instructions, and 
do not perceive themselves as empowered and required to make 
the moral decision whether the state should execute another human 
being.84 By the same token, the increasing complexity of the law of 
capital punishment may serve to distract judges from the ''existen-
tial moment of moral perception"85 that lies at the heart of the deci-
sion to impose - or to uphold the imposition of - the death 
penalty in an individual case. As Robert Weisberg has noted, 
judges and other professional actors in legal institutions "rely on 
doctrine to reassure themselves that the sanctions they inflict follow 
inevitably from the demands of neutral, disinterested legal princi-
ples, rather than from their own choice and power."86 
CONCLUSION 
Although Gatrell does not radically shift our understanding of 
criminal law and reactions to it during the period from the end of 
the eighteenth century through the abolition of public hanging, he 
has written an often affecting narrative. Even those put off by its 
tendentious presentation will find themselves moved by the stories 
of the poor and powerless, condemned to die an ignominious death 
for what were often petty crimes, adjudicated in a haphazard fash-
ion, and appealed in a process that was little better than arbitrary. 
Gatrell's account strips away our defenses and forces us to look at 
the sordid reality of both the process and the event. What emerges 
in our thoughts may be no more coherent than the reactions of the 
scaffold crowd, but there is no denying its emotional impact. This 
emotional book may shift our understanding only in marginal ways, 
but it works more powerfully on our emotions. After reading this 
book it is difficult to feel indifferent to the announcement that on 
January 25, 1996, Delaware hanged someone for the first time in 
fifty years.87 But having permitted ourselves an emotional involve-
83. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 48, at 413 (noting Robert Weisberg's analogy to the 
Milgram experiment, in which subjects in a psychological study followed the instructions they 
were given, to impose - albeit reluctantly - very painful electrical shocks on other 
subjects). 
84. See supra notes 63-64. 
85. Weisberg, supra note 81, at 353. 
86. Weisberg, supra note 81, at 384-85. 
frl. See the comments of Edmund Lyons, attorney for William Bailey, the man hanged. 
"I found the process medieval. I found it barbaric. The most chilling thing was the two 
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ment with a capital code now safely buried, it becomes impossible 
not to worry about the analogous problems that infect our own. 
fellows up on the platform with Bill with hoods on their heads." Cable News Network, Inc., 
Show: News 5:41 am ET, January 25, 1996, 11:30 Eastern Ttme, Transcript No. 1296-2. 
